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BOSMAN'S GUINEA: THE
INTERCULTURAL ROOTS OF AN
ENLIGHTENMENT DISCOURSE

WILLIAM PIETZ
One of the ways of extending the range of anthropology
is traveling, or at least reading travelogues.
Kant, Anthropology from Pragmatic Point of View

Although we no longer think of the Enlightenment as the ensemble of
ideas that descended into history in the form of the French Revolution to
punctuate a discrete stage in the progress of mankind, World Spirit, or
Western civilization, there is still a tendency to conceive the Enlightenment as, to quote Cassirer, "only the continuation and consistent development of certain tendencies in the European mind." The Enlightenment still tends to be situated solidly within the tradition of Western culture and philosophy, as that tradition's intellectual response to the
scientific understanding that began to emerge in the Renaissance. The
appeal to general models of the noble and the depraved savage to interpret
the Enlightenment notion of primitive peoples and religions contributes
to this view by characterizing Enlightenment discourse about nonEuropean cultures as a mere projection or byproduct of an already constituted Enlightenment ideology.
Such interpretations ignore the fundamental importance of ongoing
colonial relations and cross-cultural mercantile practices for eighteenthcentury Europe, and thereby fail to do justice to the full complexity and
real novelty of that global intellectual response to contemporary history
that was the Enlightenment. While there has been considerable attention
to the influence of voyage texts on the European literary imagination, we
are just beginning to take seriously the constitutive role of the problems
and categories that developed in early European colonial experience for
the discourse and project of Enlightenment theory. My paper is intended
to contribute to this endeavor by approaching Enlightenment discourse
about primitive religion and the mentality of savages, not through the
familiar general images and abstract models, but through an examination
of the specific intertextual genealogy of one important discursive figure,
that of the African fetish worshipper.
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My argument is that in this figure we can trace a direct continuity
between a discourse developed in an ongoing crosscultural situation outside Europe—the discourse of fetishes and fetish worship that developed
on the Gold Coast of West Africa during the late fifteenth, sixteenth, and
seventeenth centuries—and the discourse about the unenlightened,
superstitious fetish worshipper and the general theoretical problem of
fetishism as the primordial form of 'natural religion' that was an important component of Enlightenment discourse. For eighteenth-century
Europe, the figure of the African fetish worshipper was a paradigmatic
example of what was not enlightenment. Moreover, a close textual study
brings to light a common problematic among these discourses: an anthropological problem of cross-cultural judgement determined by the
question of the social value of material objects, a question not central to
the problematic of earlier Western philosophical discourse.
We might take the word "Guinea" as an emblem of the novel problem
constitutive of Enlightenment discourse and theory. "Guinea" was the
word used to designate black Africa—a non-European, non-monotheist
land not covered by the histories and cultural codes of old Europe or
classical antiquity—but "guinea" was also the word for the gold coin
which, being the first machine manufactured coin and therefore the first
coin immune to debasement by clipping and shaving around the edges,
helped bring about the unprecedented monetary stability that Europe
knew after 1726. The connection between the two meanings of the word
is, of course, anything but arbitrary; the coin was first struck in 1668 by
the English Royal African Company from gold it imported from West
Africa. It is almost as if between these two psycho-geographical poles of
the distant strange land and the newly mysterious monetarized Europe,
all natural objects with commodity value appeared in a new, exotic light,
almost a new field of consciousness. For "Guinea'' was also an adjective
added to familiar nouns to name new things and species which now
appeared in Europe as commodities imported from faroff lands: not just
"Guinea gold" but "Guinea fowl," "Guinea hens," "Guinea corn,"
"Guinea pepper," "Guinea wood" and on and on. Indeed the adjective
"Guinea" came to stand for any faroff land, not just black Africa. For
instance, "guinea pigs" are from South America. And of course a "New
Guinea" was discovered in the South Seas already in 1545. Finally, the
word "Guinea" connoted one of history's greatest abominations, then
being perpetrated by Europeans: the African slave trade. A "Guinea
ship" was a slave ship, and a "Guinea trader" a slave-dealer.
The cognitive codes and textual practices of early European voyages to
non-monotheist lands raised the problem of the material object in a new
5
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way. The very production of a geography of navigation routes, charted
measurements of distances and depths, and fixed terrestrial landmarks
already assembled a world-picture of functional objects stripped of cultural meaning and social value. And while the first Portuguese voyagers
to black Africa in the fifteenth century understood themselves and their
actions according to the codes of feudal Christendom and the Crusades,
their voyages were as often as not funded by venture capital out of Lisbon
or Genoa; we can see an increasingly self-conscious mercantile mentality
emerge in the accounts of West Africa during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In these texts we see the transcoding of material objects, not only across cultural boundaries, but out of their status as social
values within the codes of both tribal black Africa and Christian feudal
Europe into the mercantile code of the commodity form. The accompanying discourse of natural history which became so important in these
texts was clearly complementary to the mercantile code insofar as it
identified species and things as purely natural, nonsocial material objects
that could then be evaluated as potential commodities or potential dangers to the orderly conduct of trade. It is no new insight to say that the
codes of navigational geography, mercantile commodification, and natural history at work in these texts helped construct a new, self-evident
"nature" filled with material objects experienced as pre-social and outside any general semantic order of transcendently (whether Christian or
Platonic) ordained human meanings. It is rather the cross-cultural context of this process that I wish to consider here as it appears in one
discursive constellation.
It was the pidgin word ' 'Fetisso" that emerged on the coast especially
around the trade fort of Elmina which most clearly expressed this radically novel cross-cultural situation. For thirteenth-century Portuguese
priests the word ' feitiqo" named the amulets and non-Christian talismans worn by common people for certain magical effects; "feitiqo" was
a synonym for 'witchcraft' but without necessary attribution of actual
traffic with the Devil. Feitiqos were understood to be produced by ignorant, simple people; feitiqos might indeed produce effects through the
natural magic of God's created world, but their users might also, either
purposely or unknowingly, draw on demonic powers and might even call
forth the Devil himself. In any event,feitiqos were in direct competition
with the crucifixes, rosaries, and little saints proper to the Christian code,
and their use was both heretical and illegal.
When the Portuguese voyagers first encountered non-Islamicized
black kingdoms such as Benin, they faced a paradox, since orderly
societies could only exist under a Law or Faith, and the only Laws were
7
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those of the three monotheisms: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. While
blacks might be conceived as pagan idolators, their religious duties and
social institutions seemed to depend less on idolos (free standing statues)
then feitiqos (worn about the body or assembled from heterogenous
ingredients) by which Africans took contractual oaths, swore to tell the
truth during trials, and made offerings. Moreover, the feitiqos that first
attracted the voyagers' attention were little gold rings and ornaments
which seemed both religious objects like the European crucifixes, and
marks of social rank, and yet at other times in the case of women, pure
aesthetic ornaments. Europeans reported the astonishment that Africans
proved willing to trade the gold fetishes—which obviously had great
value for them—for objects the Europeans valued as little more than
trifles. Astonishment was followed by contempt for these Africans
who valued objects, both in the register of commodities and in the register of religion, that the Europeans regularly called "trinkets," "trifles"
and "trash."
The pidgin word "Fetisso" that developed on the coast of West Africa
gathered together semantically the essential problems not only of crosscultural perceptions of social order, but of the transvaluation into commodities of objects that were social values. And it did this specifically in
the register of a discourse about religious objects. By the time Pieter de
Marees introduced the word "Fetisso" into the written languages of
northern Europe in 1602, the word was simultaneously a name for
African religious objects, emblems of nobility, vehicles for oaths, aesthetic and erotic ornaments, and gold rings and figures alienable as commodities, and also a term that characterized the general socio-religious
system of African peoples in a complex and far from non-contradictory
semantic field. In addition, the term's original analogy to Catholic Christian objects and practices could be asserted as more or less an identity by
Protestants of the new Dutch republic.
All the facets of this complex discourse of the ' 'Fetisso" appear in the
text which was the authoritative account of black Africa for eighteenthcentury Europe. I refer to the Dutch merchant Willem Bosman's A New
and Accurate Account of the Coast of Guinea; as my title implies, the
Guinea known by the Enlightenment was above all Bosman's Guinea.
Willem Bosman sailed to the Guinea coast at the age of sixteen in 1688
and by 1698 had become Chief Merchant for the Dutch West Indies
Company, second in authority only to the Director-General on the
Guinea coast. When his brutal superior was ousted by the company in
1701, Bosman was swept out with him and found himself at twenty-nine
back in Holland at the end of his career. The book he wrote in 1702,
which has been called ' 'one of the most popular travelogues ever writ11
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ten," was addressed specifically to the Board of Directors of the Dutch
West Indies Company doubtless to remind them of his own value and
unfair treatment, but also at least in part as an argument in favor of the
gold trade and against the slave trade as the focus of company policy.
Bosman, who was a true believer in the mercantile ideology of an ideal
market society, did not so much argue that the slave trade was bad, as that
slaving was bad trade.
But Bosman's account found an audience that extended far beyond the
directors of the Dutch West Indies Company. Upon its publication in
Dutch in 1703, the book because of its greater scope and detail, superior
factual reliability, and sceptical empiricist spirit at once displaced earlier
authorities on the Gold and Slave Coasts of Guinea. French and English
translations appeared in 1705, and a German translation was published in
1706. There was an expanded second Dutch edition in 1709 and three
subsequent editions in 1711, 1718, and 1737. A second edition of the
English translation appeared in 1721, and an Italian translation came out
in 1752-54.
Another index of the supreme success of Bosman's account is the
frequency of its plagiarization by subsequent eighteenth-century accounts. And while Labat's famous 1730 account of Guinea claimed to
rely mostly on des Marchais, many of the facts, interpretations and
anecdotes about the Gold and Slave Coasts were drawn from Bosman,
whose acknowledgement tended to be avoided for reasons of nationalism
and colonial rivalry in the area. In 1743-47 there appeared the great
English collection of voyage accounts by Thomas Astley, who attempted
a critical edition of all the accounts in the earlier collections of Hakluyt,
Purchas, and Harris. In his preface, Astley justifies the need for such a
critical edition because authors so frequently copied or stole from each
other, he writes, "not excepting Bosman himself." Bosman is clearly
the byword for an original and trustworthy author. In Astley's volumes
on Guinea Bosman is by far the leading authority. Astley's collection was
translated, with additional material, into a famous French collection by
the novelist Abbe Prevost (in 1746-68) and into a German version by
Schwabe (in 1747-74).
Beyond its high status among readers specifically interested in Guinea,
Bosman's book at once gained the attention of the leading intellectuals of
the day. We find copies of the French edition in the libraries of Newton
and Locke, and a copy of the English version in Gibbon's library. It is not
listed among Adam Smith's books, but Smith had a thorough knowledge
of the text and refers to it frequently in his Lectures on Jurisprudence of
the 1760s.
But it was Bosman's discussion of fetish worship in the tenth and
13
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nineteenth letters of his book that especially aroused the interest of
eighteenth-century thinkers. Already in 1705 we find Pierre Bayle correcting Jacques Bernard's misinterpretation of Bosman's account of the
nature of fetish religion and using Bosman's evidence to prove that pagan
(and more generally all priestly) religion was grounded in mercenary
motives and, far from promoting ethical behavior, systematically eradicated it. Indeed it was Bosman's explicit thesis that African fetish
religion in particular and African social order in general were founded
entirely upon the principle of interest.
Bosman's Guinea is simultaneously a triumph of scrupulous observation and the new empiricist scepticism, and a bizarre phantasm wherein
the new forces and categories of the mercantile world economy then
reshaping African and European societies alike were read into a strange
social order and locale. This phantasm itself originated in the intercultural spaces of uiw Guinea coast, and many of Bosman's reports and
interpretations are derived from black 'informants' who dwelt in this
space in alienation from their own societies.
Bosman recounts the following creation story as widespread among
"Africans"; the Negroes tell us, writes Bosman:
20

21

22

that in the beginning God created Black as well as White Men to people the
World together; thereby not only hinting but endeavoring to prove that their
race was as soon in the world as ours; and to bestow a yet greater Honour on
themselves, they tell us that God having created these two sorts of Men,
offered two sorts of Gifts, viz., Gold, and the Knowledge of Arts of Reading
and Writing, giving the Blacks the first Election, who chose Gold, and left the
knowledge of Letters to the White. God granted their Request, but being
incensed at their Avarice, resolved that the Whites should for ever be their
Masters, and they obliged to wait on them as Slaves.
23

Here we have a curious intercultural myth enabled by the generation of an
axis of opposition between gold (as the material object of selfish, natural
desire, pre-ethical and pre-social, hence immoral) and writing (an order
of knowledge, hence social and moral). If we ask the dialectical question
recently rediscovered as a method by post-structuralism under the name
"deconstruction," In what sense is gold itself already writing and in what
sense is writing itself already gold? thereby reversing the terms and
seeking the historical context from which the underlying semiotic structure has been displaced, we are led to the ideas of the monetary values
inscribed (written) on gold coins and of paper money (i.e. writing that
"is" gold) and book-keeping accounts. That is, the new monetary system
of commodity prices and cost calculations that had now become the
self-conscious code and system of motives and actions for Europeans
who came to the West African coast. The myth itself explains and
24
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justifies the most horrific problem created by this new logic (the enslavement of blacks by whites) as punishment for African avarice—an
interpretive reversal worthy of Freud's dreamwork theory.
Indeed the way Bosman's anecdotes function in his text is not dissimilar to the way daydreams function in waking life as wish-fulfillments that
reveal the underlying desires and problems that determine the interpretation of experience. It is especially Bosman's anecdotes about the cult of
the snake fetish at the great slave port of Whydah that are of interest,
since it was this snake cult that, beginning with Bayle in 1705, became the
paradigmatic example of fetishism throughout the eighteenth century;
and it is in these anecdotes that we can most easily examine the discursive
structures that textualized and ideologized the earlier fetish discourse into
the discourse that became part of the general language of the Enlightenment.
One often retold anecdote concerns the senseless massacre of a large
number of hogs. We find this anecdote repeated in Labat (1730) in Astley
and Prevost (1740s), in the popular journal The British Magazine (1761),
in a 1765 article by Baaron d'Holbach on the serpent fetish in the Encyclopedic itself, and we find the incident mentioned in the 1757 text in
which the word "fetishism" was first coined and proposed as the general
theoretical term for the primordial religion of mankind: the Burgundian
parliamentarian andphilosophe Charles de Brasses' book On the Cult of
the Fetish Gods, or Parallel between the Ancient Religion of Egypt and
the Present-Day Religion of black Africa.
The anecdote runs as follows:
25

26

In the Year 1697. my brother Factor Mr. Nicholas Poll, (who then managed
the Slave Trade for our Company at Fida) had the Diversion of a very pleasant
Scene. A Hog being bitten by a Snake, in Revenge, or out of Love to God's
Flesh, seiz'd and devour'd him in sight of the Negroes, who were not near
enough to prevent him. Upon this the Priests all complain'd to the King; but the
Hog could not defend himself, and had no Advocate; and the Priests, unreasonable enough in their Request, begg'd of the King to Publish a Royal Order,
that all the Hogs in his Kingdom should be forthwith kill'd, and the Swiny
Race extirpated, without so much as deliberating whether it was reasonable to
destroy the Innocent with the Guilty.
The King's Command was Publish'd all over the Country. And in Pursuance
thereof, it was not a little diverting, to see Thousands of Blacks arm'd with
Swords and Clubs to execute the Order; whilst on the other side no small
Number of those who were owners of the Hogs were in like manner arm'd in
their Defence, urging their Innocence, but all in vain. The Slaughter went on,
and nothing was heard but the dismal sound of Kill, Kill, which cost many an
honest Hog his Life, that had lived with an unspotted Character to his dying
Day. And doubtless the whole Race had been utterly extirpated, if the King
(who is not naturally bloody-minded) perhaps mov'd to it by some Lovers of
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1982
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Bacon, had not recall'd his Order by a Counter one, importing, that there was
already enough of innocent Blood shed, and that their God ought to be appeased with so rich a Sacrifice.
You may judge whether this was not very welcome News to the Remainder
of the Hogs, when they saw themselves freed from such a cruel Persecution. whereof they took particular Care for the future, not to incur the same
Penalty.
27

In this anecdote Bosman achieves the desired rhetorical effect by making
ironic use of the literary genre of the fable. The black fetish worshippers
are characterized as literally believing in the sort of fabulous world in
which animals talk and can act as purposeful moral agents, while the
European author's heavy-handed irony (' 'the Diversion of a very pleasant Scene" and so forth) signals his realistic grasp of the natural world.
The reader is addressed in the mode of fable as a child who can comprehend the true state of affairs by joining in the author's ironic contempt;
and the reader is offered the chance to choose between reason and delusion in such locutions as the alternative explanations ' 'in Revenge, or out
of Love to God's Flesh" and in the concluding apostrophe "You may
judge whether this was not very welcome News" to the hogs. Far from
conveying the morally edifying message of a fable, Bosman's mock fable
presents a world turned morally upside down.
But beyond this, the anecdote is textualized by certain discursive structures which occur throughout Bosman's book in his characterizations of
the people and society of Guinea, and which constitute the particular
ideologization of the fetish discourse that Bosman encountered on the
coast. One approach to ideology is to conceive it as the semiotic structuring of some real historical problem so that it appears to be a formal
problem in which whatever counts as rational knowledge, on the one
hand, and moral power, on the other, seem to have been separated,
perverted, and set in opposition to each other. Reason, sundered from the
purpose of legitimate moral power, appears perverted by immoral motives, while public power, sundered from the guidance of rational knowledge, appears directed by violent, irrational purposes. Such an ideological structure tends to generate a character system whose actors are seen to
embody the different components of that structure.
Bosman's anecdotes about the snake cult present us with a character
system that has a familiar Enlightenment configuration. The immoral
perversion of reason appears in the figures of the rational, economically
self-interested priests of the cult who hypocritically manipulate the fears
and superstitious credulity of the people. The superstitious, terrordriven populace, who represent African society as such, embody the
combination of the principle of irrationality with a state of complete
28
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political powerlessness (i.e. the lack of both knowledge and power).
Another figure is the king, who embodies the corruption of the public
power (complementary to the people's absolute subjection), but who "is
not naturally bloody-minded" and is therefore capable of hearing the
voice of reason and becoming, at least momentarily, an enlightened
rather than an Oriental despot.
An important character type associated with the snake cult that does
not appear in this anecdote but appears in the others is the African
woman. African women were a great scandal and fascination to the
Europeans, and they were invariably presented—not only by voyage
account authors but by learned Enlightenment writers such as Holbach,
de Brasses, Kant, and ultimately Castilhon, who wrote a libertine novel
in 1769 entitled Zingha, Queen of Angola, which was a source for the
novelist Sade at the end of the century —as at once absolutely powerless
slaves to their husbands (in the domain of African family life) and as
over-powerful intruders in the domain of political power. In Whydah, the
king's wives were his principal executive force, and the women of the
snake cult held high public esteem.
Bosman tells two anecdotes in which women play the role of the force
of violent irrationality that perverts the public institutions and political
power of society (a role played by the hog slaughterers in the first anecdote). In the first anecdote, an African friend of Bosman is unjustly
accused of a crime; the king sends his women to raze the man's house and
bring him to be executed; the man, who is friendly with Europeans and
possesses such tokens of scientific rationality as a keg of gunpowder,
stands with a blazing torch by the keg and threatens to blow up the
women along with the house and himself. The women are daunted and
return to the king, but the man beats them back to the palace and explains
the situation to the king (who again is capable of hearing reason), who
rescinds his judgement, and the man is saved. In the other anecdote, the
wife of the same man, who is a priestess of the snake cult, has an attack of
what de Brasses, retelling the anecdote in his book, terms "hysterical
vapors" —and which Bosman and others characterize as a ruse, a
phony bout of religious enthusiasm, which women used to become masters of their husbands, and which the priests, who cured the women of
their religious frenzy, used to extort yet more money from the populace.
Bosman relates that one day the man became fed up with his wife's fits,
and instead of taking her to the cult temple to be cured, led her down to the
shore in sight of a European ship, whereupon her terror that he was about
to sell her into slavery cured her permanently of her deceitful hysterics
and turned her into a dutiful wife.
Women in Bosman's text tend to embody that force of irrational pur29
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poses and instinctive mendaciousness which perverts the institutions of
legitimate power. The exploiting priests, the irrational women, the
superstitious polity, and the despotic king constitute the basic character
system of Bosman's Guinea as a world that will remain morally upside
down until knowledge and power are reunited.
In the anecdote of the hog massacre we can see the nature of Bosman's
own underlying desire in the wish-fulfilling moment when "reason" and
legitimate political power are reconciled by the emergence of a new
group produced by the general social crisis of the hog slaughter, none
other than the suddenly self-conscious and unified bourgeoisie (in the
form of the hog owners) who rise up to defend their property and who in
their identity as "lovers of Bacon" (rational consumers) catch the king's
ear and avert a disaster to society as a whole (permanent loss of an
important food source) through the sovereign's exercise of his absolute
law-making powers. Throughout Bosman's book fetish worship appears
as the key to African society considered as a theoretical problem, and
Bosman's explicit thesis—which Pierre Bayle and subsequent Enlightenment authors found compelling—was that fetish religion was the
perversion of the true principle of social order: interest. Institutionalized
superstition—the religion of fetishes—was interpreted by Bosman as the
specific social force that blocked otherwise spontaneous and natural
market activities that would bring about a healthy economic and a truly
moral social order. This is consistent with Bosman's belief in mercantile
activity as a Utopian social principle, which is also evident in his allegiance to the dwindling gold trade and his hostility to the slave trade as
an accidental aberration of the profit motive rather than a logical consequence of it.
Fetish religion was thus a priestly conspiracy; priests and merchants
acted from the same motives, but where merchants were honest and
moral, priests were hypocritical and immoral. But there is still the question of the nature of popular fetish superstition itself. Bosman's use of
the fable genre in fact suggests his answer to this: blacks confused the
impersonal order of natural things with the moral order of human society.
They anthropomorphized nature, believed that animals talked or at least
exercised other spiritual powers. But Africans also imported the mechanical character of nature into the human order of decision, purpose, and
policy formation. Specifically this is explained by the first-encounter
theory of the origin of superstitious fixations as a sort of erroneous
primitive empiricism. In the following passage, Bosman claims to be
quoting his principal native informant, who explains:
that the Number of their Gods was endless and innumerable: For (said he) any
of us being resolved to undertake anything of Importance, we first of all search

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol9/iss9/3

10

Pietz: Bosman's Guinea: The Intercultural Roots of an Enlightenment Disc
11

out a God to prosper our designed Undertaking; and going out of Doors with
this Design, take the first Creature that presents itself to our Eyes, whether
Dog, Cat, or the most contemptible Animal in the World, for our God; or
perhaps instead of that any Inanimate that fall in our way, whether a Stone, a
piece of Wood, or any thing else of the same Nature. This new chosen God is
immediately presented with an offering; which is accompanied by a Solemn
Vow, that if he pleaseth to prosper our Undertakings, for the future we will
always worship and esteem him as a God. If our design prove successful, we
have discovered a new and assisting God, which is daily presented with fresh
offerings: But if the contrary happen, the new God is rejected as a useless
Tool, and consequently returns to his Primitive Estate: He went on in these
following Words, we make and break our Gods daily, and consequently are the
Masters and Inventers of what we Sacrifice to.
31

Now it is a truism that a member of any given culture tends to perceive the
actions and motives of members of an alien culture as based on a principle
of complete arbitrariness, an incomprehensible order based on pure
chaos. What is remarkable is that this idea was proposed explicitly as a
theory of African society by leading minds of the eighteenth century. In
his influential presentation of the characteristics of the four basic races of
mankind, Linnaeus proposed that while the regulatory social principle of
Europeans was law, for American Indians custom, and for Asiatics
opinion, the social principle of Africans was "caprice." For the Kant
of 1764, fetish worship was explained by the most degenerate of aesthetic
principles, "the trifling" (lappisch).
In short, African fetishist's superstition was understood to entail the
personification of nature by attribution of spiritual purposes and powers
to natural material objects, and the mechanization (or depersonalization)
of the social order and human action by finding a principle of decision in
the random encounters proper to natural events.
Now we can find more or less identical principles of explanation,
structures of ideas, and systems of characters in exemplary Enlightenment texts. For instance, in Voltaire's conte philosophique of 1759, there
is a moment when Candide and his worthy valet Cacambo travel from
that best of all possible Utopias, El Dorado, back to a historical world in
which reality is marked by the constant eruption of violent events whose
extreme randomness is matched only by the extreme misery and horror
that are their human consequences. This passage involves an encounter
with an enslaved African fetish worshipper whom Candide and Cacambo
find stretched across the road that leads from El Dorado to Surinam.
Beyond his near nakedness, this figure is striking to the travelers for his
lack of a left leg and a right hand. The conversation that ensues conveys
an authorial message whose ideas and sentiments we all recognize as
typical of Enlightenment discourse:
32

33
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"Oh, good Lord!" said Candide to him in Dutch. "What are you going
there, my friend, in that horrible state I see you in?"
"I am waiting for my master Monsieur Vanderdendur, the famous merchant," the Negro replied.
"Was it Monsieur Vanderdendur," said Candide, "who treated you this
way?"
"Yes, sir," said the Negro, "it is the custom. They gave us a pair of cloth
shorts twice a year for all our clothing. When we work in the sugar mills and we
catch our finger in the millstone, they cut off our hand; when we try to run
away, they cut off a leg; both things have happened to me. It is at this price that
you eat sugar in Europe. However, when my mother sold me for ten patacons
on the Guinea coast, she said to me: 'My dear child, bless our fetishes, worship
them always, they will make you live happily; you have the honor to be a slave
of our lords the whites, and thereby you are making the fortunes of your father
and mother.' Alas! I don't know if I made their fortune, but they didn't make
mine. Dogs, monkeys, parrots are a thousand times less miserable than we are.
The Dutch fetishes who converted me tell me every Sunday that we are all,
blacks and whites, children of Adam. I am no genealogist, but if those preachers
are telling the truth, we are all second cousins. Now you must admit that no one
could treat his relatives in a more horrible way."
"Oh, Pangloss!" exclaimed Candide, "you had not guessed this abomination; this does it, at last I shall have to renounce your optimism."
"What is optimism?" said Cacambo.
"Alas," said Candide, "it is the mania of maintaining that all is well when
we are miserable!" And he shed tears as he looked at his Negro, and he entered
Surinam weeping.
34

Not only has Candide through his encounter with the Negro fetish worshipper passed back to the non-utopian real world, he has moved from
delusion to enlightenment, liberated from the dogmatic optimism of
Leibnitzian systems theory whose premise of the necessarily harmonious
unity of the existing world system enables Pangloss to demonstrate that
noses exist to permit the wearing of spectacles, legs were created to fill up
trousers, stones created to be shaped into castles for aristocrats, and pigs
made to be eaten. Candide's encounter frees him from this farcical faith
that the natural purposes of material objects were designed to promote
human happiness. Candide arrives at a new philosophical perspective
personified by Martin the Manichean, who becomes Candide's traveling
companion at the end of the chapter after the Dutch merchant Monsieur
Vanderdendur has run off with the last of Candide's El Dorado wealth.
The ironic knowledge that the real world of events should be but is not
a harmonious and unified rational system on the order of the Newtonian
solar system, a mechanism such as a clock, or an ideal commodity market
and monetary system, is of course a hallmark of Enlightenment thought,
an idea crystallized in the historical imagination of the day in the form of
the 1755 Lisbon earthquake (a natural catastrophe) and the Seven Years
35
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War (a social catstrophe considered the first primarily colonial war between European nations).
An idea even more characteristic of Enlightenment thought than the
scandal of the chaos of events is the equation of obedience to custom and
tradition in the social domain with superstitious credulity in the domain
of religion. We see this equation and its significance in the figure of the
victimized African, whose blind obedience to custom (lying passively in
the road, waiting for Vanderdendur) becomes, despite all the coercion
and mutilation, a kind of self-incurred immaturity (to use Kant's famous
phrase) through his credulous reverence for the African and European
fetishes preached by his mother and the Dutch clergymen. Voltaire's
point is that "fetish worship" keeps people happy no matter how miserable they are. He is using the familiar eighteenth-century figure of the
African fetish worshipper to have Candide (and the reader) look into a
contemporary historical mirror in which he perceives his own misery and
dupery in that of the other. And indeed Candide attains his enlightenment
that the rationalist optimism of modern scientism according to which
there is a necessary built-in harmony between natural objects and human
ends is no less a fetishism than that of primitive religion and Christian
dogma.
The character system associated with the figure of the fetish worshipper in Candide is essentially that found in Bosman's account of the
Whydah snake cult, with the significant exception that for Bosman the
problem is the repression of the mercantile principle, while for Voltaire it
is its unrestricted exercise.
While Voltaire used the figure of the fetish worshipper as a simple
rhetorical weapon, this period (the late 1750s and the early 1760s) was
also the moment when primitive or "natural" religion was established as
one of the fundamental problems of Enlightenment theory (although the
issue can surely be traced back to Bayle at the beginning of the century).
The seminal work was David Hume's essay The Natural History of
Religion, which was published in 1757, but which had circulated two
years earlier among French intellectuals. It is well known that much of
the final third of the book by Charles de Brasses in which the term
"fetishism" was coined was a word for word unacknowledged translation of Hume's essay, with the word ' fetichisme" substituted whenever
the word "polytheism" occurred. This led to the opinion, already
formed by Diderot and others at the time, that De Brasses' book was of
little theoretical originality or interest. And indeed de Brasses offers no
alternative theoretical explanations of primitive religious phenomena to
those of Hume.
36
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Hume argued that polytheism was the original religion of mankind
because primitive peoples were especially subject to a multitude of sudden and capricious natural events (again, the insight that came to public
consciousness in the form of the Lisbon earthquake). Polytheism, according to Hume, attributed "invisible, intelligent powers" (i.e. the
gods) to natural things and events; this was the result of three distinct
factors: ignorance of the true mechanistic causes of natural events; fear of
one's helpless subjection to these unpredictable events; and the human
imagination's propensity to anthropomorphize natural objects:
There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like
themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities, with which they are
familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious. We find
human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if
not corrected by experience and reflection, ascribe malice or good-will to
every thing, that hurts or pleases us. Hence the frequency and beauty of the
prosopoeia in poetry, where trees, mountains and streams are personified, and
the inanimate parts of nature acquire sentiment and passion . . . Mankind,
being placed in such an absolute ignorance of causes, and being at the same
time so anxious concerning their future fortune . . . acknowledges a dependence on invisible powers, possessed of sentiment and intelligence . . . In
proportion as any man's life is governed by accident, we always find, that he
increases in superstition.
39

Superstition, argues Hume, like Bosman, rests on principles of the anthropomorphization of natural things and the subjection of human purpose to determination by the accidental events of nature.
While de Brasses repeats, indeed, copies out, Hume's arguments, he
tends to eliminate Hume's argument for the fundamental importance of
the ignorance of causes. Moreover, the argument about anthropomorphism itself becomes problematical in de Brasses' text. While de Brasses
follows Hume in arguing that fetishism rests on "/'habitude de personifier . . . une metaphore naturelle a I'homme " and that it completes
"la superstition nee de la crainte des accidents " proper to "1'empire du
hazard," he asserts with equal force that fetishism is a "culte direct rendu
sans figure aux productions animales et vegetales . " How is it that de
Brasses can argue that fetishism rests on a principle of natural metaphor and still be "sansfigure"! Indeed the opening pages of de Brasses'
book are a denunciation of that mode of interpretation he calls ' figuris me."
De Brasses presented his essay before the Academie des Inscriptions
et Belles-Lettres in 1757. The members were sufficiently outraged to
cause de Brasses to withdraw the work from the Academie; he published
it anonymously in Geneva in 1760. The book was scandalous not merely
40
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for the general idea of fetishism that it framed, but for its historical claims
and its historical methodology. De Brasses defined "fetishism" as "any
religion which has for its cult object animals or inanimate terrestrial
beings." ' It was thus, as Diderot wrote to de Brasses in 1757 after
reading the manuscript, "la religion premiere, generate et universelle. "
In the late eighteenth century, fetishism had been widely accepted as the
general form of primitive religion.
De Brasses' insistence that fetishism was the cult "of certain terrestrial and material objects" distinguished it from cults of celestial
phenomena (which tended to be viewed as proto-Deist intimations of the
orderly frame of nature) and from cults viewed along Euhemerist lines as
religious practices and myths that were distorted commemorations of
actual historical events and national heroes. But above all his theory
opposed historical interpellations which viewed religions and myths as
figurative expressions of the eternal truths of speculative metaphysics.
By calling fetishism a cult of earthly objects and the concerns of what we
would call "everyday life" (rather than of the exceptional and catastrophic events that Hume stressed) and as "direct . . . without figure,"
de Brasses set a materialist historical theory in opposition to the interpretive theories of the Western philosophical tradition. Metaphor and anthropomorphization were now located outside the rationalist logos and
within a non-transcendent material world. This radical break with Western metaphysics constituted by the idea of fetishism is confirmed in
Hegel's location of the African world (characterized by its principle of
fetish worship) outside History: the fetish was that contradictory state of
Spirit (more precisely, the very concept of contradiction was inapplicable
to it) that managed to generate a social order and subjective type without
participation in the Idea.
De Brasses' methodological position was equally radical. He insisted
that ancient peoples and cultures (i.e. those of classical antiquity) could
be interpreted only on the basis of analogies to actually observable
present-day peoples. It is this aspect of de Brasses' work that won him
recognition as a forerunner of modern anthropologists. De Brasses' final
sentence states:
4

4 2

43

It is not in possibilities, but in man himself that one must study man: it is not a
matter of imagining what might or ought to have been done, but of observing
what is d o n e .
44

In his ground-breaking anthropological work of 1871, Primitive Culture,
in which he develops his theory of primitive religion as animism, E. B.
Taylor took this sentence from Du Culte des dieux fetiches as his epigraph.
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What was "enlightenment"? Both friends and critics of the Enlightenment have had difficulty finding any positive answer. In itself,
enlightenment was a purely negative concept: its supporters find it most
truly expressed in that moderate tolerance and liberal humaneness that
opposed the excesses of the French Revolution, and in the general admonition to think for oneself. Its critics, whether conservative or radical,
see the sheer negativity of Enlightenment thought as culminating in the
Terror itself and generally in the ceaseless abolition of all particular
social forms and positive values—expressed most completely in the radical relativism of Sade.
But "enlightenment" did have a specific other, its opposite: superstition. And it is in eighteenth-century theories of superstition that we can
find a positive content, along with a way to situate Enlightenment discourse in its historical context. In the 1750s the problem of superstition
was formulated in terms of the theoretical problem of primitive religion,
and the novel term naming this problem was "fetishism." Yet the basic
structure of ideas and explanations found in Enlightenment discourse
was in fact worked out to a great extent in the text of Willem Bosman.
Bosman's Guinea was that psycho-geographical reality which concretely
exemplified a world without enlightenment.
But Bosman's Guinea was a very specific interpretation: fetish worship was that principle underlying African social reality that effectively
blocked natural market forces and mercantilist economic rationality.
While this aspect was repressed in Enlightenment fetish theory, it was
nonetheless intensely present in the discourse and in the world of those
intellectuals using the term. For instance, de Brosses not only had estates
and vassals in Burgundy and became president of the Burgundian parliament, both he and his wife lost much of their capital in investments with
the French Company of the Indies. In a letter of December 31, 1764, de
Brosses complains bitterly of having spent most of the year in Paris
attending to business matters of the company, finally pulling out at the
loss of half his capital and two thirds of his income. We should remember that by the period of the Encyclopedists the "material objects"
of Europe and those of the colonized areas of the non-European world
were united in a common monetary code in a very real way. When
Voltaire was negotiating to rent Tournay from de Brosses, land values
had risen as investments flowed inland as a result of the loss of French
colonies and markets during the Seven Years War. Consider even the case
of Immanuel Kant, who had neither feudal estates nor capital to invest.
His first paying job was as curator of an aristocrat's cabinet of ethnographic curiosities, and for many years his sole source of income derived
45
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from the popular public lectures he gave on world geography and anthopology to the educated public of the port city of Konigsberg. Indeed
it was Kant who first instituted a course of lectures on anthropology in a
German university.
I must conclude here with the suggestion that certain aspects of Kant's
philosophy—certainly the greatest theoretical response to the problem
named by "Enlightenment"—can be clarified if studied as solutions to
the colonial problematic of cross-cultural judgement and the social value
of material objects. I have mentioned that in his pre-critical aesthetics of
1764 Kant explained fetish worship as an expression of the lowest form of
the beautiful sensibility, "the trifling." That the question of fetishism
continued to hold a place in Kant's theoretical reflections is indicated in
one of Kant's last works, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone,
when Kant coins the phrase "legal fetishism" to name cults devoted to
purely external observations and speaks of "fetishism, familiar in other
connections." The question of anthropomorphism and of the conflation of the contingent order of nature and the ethical order of human
freedom holds an important place not only in this work but in the Critique
of Judgement as well. While Charles de Brosses had offered no original
theoretical explanation of "fetishism," it had been his odd genius to
formulate the idea itself by identifying that ultimate unthinkable historical fact for the eighteenth century—Egyptian zoolatry—with the cult of
the snake fetish at Whydah described by Bosman and others. The resulting discourse of fetishism that brought together problems of anthropomorphization and the worship of organic terrestrial beings is an
important unexamined source for Kant's most novel philosophical contribution: his theory of aesthetic and teleological judgement, whose
ground Kant located at the very origin of the distinction between the
order of nature (based on concepts of causal necessity and mechanical
laws) and the order of ethical human action (based on concepts of unconditional freedom and final purposes). In Kant's theory of teleological
judgement the basic problem is the radical inconceivability of natural
purpose (the fusion of the mechanical laws of nature and a final purpose)
in organic beings (such as a blade of grass or, for that matter, a snake).
And it is not accidental that his explanation of aesthetic judgement in
terms of the concept of purposiveness is an implicit anthropological
theory of animism.
I believe we can shed new light on what the term "Enlightenment"
meant as a theoretical problem for the eighteenth century by looking at
the novel problem of the social valuation of "natural," material objects
expressed in Enlightenment discourse explaining superstition, and by
46
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locating this in turn in the problem of cross-cultural judgement whose
roots certainly lay outside Europe and probably outside that questionable
discursive construct named "Western civilization."
University of California
at Santa Cruz
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